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In the ancient labyrinth-story King Minos of Crete directed his greatest architect, Daedalus, to build a large complex building with intricate passageways to imprison the Minotaur, a monstrous half-man half-bull creature, at its center. In the first part the ancient hero, Theseus, escapes the labyrinth. In the second part King Minos imprisons Daedalus and his son Icarus in the Labyrinth resulting in Icarusʼ death during an escape attempt. 6 The background is this: A foolish decision at Athens results in the death of King Minosʼ only son by a dangerous bull. Enraged, King Minos captures Athens and requires that Athens periodically send a group of Athenian youths to be sacrificed to the Minotaur. Theseus, the mythical founder of Athens, offers to be one of victims but his plan is to kill the Minotaur and end the slaughter of his kinsfolk. Fortunately, Ariadne, the Kingʼs daughter and Princess of ancient Crete, attracted to Theseus, gives him a ball of thread, "Ariadneʼs thread," to "point the way" out of the labyrinth. Theseus fastens one end of the thread to the entrance, travels to the center, kills the Minotaur, and follows the thread back to freedom. 7 First, the labyrinth is a confusing structure of pathways in which one easily becomes lost. Both labyrinths and mazes, are confusing structures in which one can easily become lost. Indeed, the etymology of "maze" traces to "amaze," 8 means to "overwhelm or confuse with sudden surprise or wonder," but can also mean "stupefied, irrational, or foolish." 8 But it is customary to distinguish between a unicursal single non-branching labyrinth that leads to the center from a multi-cursual branching maze involving choices and dead ends. 9 Whereas a maze need not, have a center, the center of the labyrinth (home to the Minotaur) plays a crucial role in the labyrinth-story. Thus, all labyrinths are mazes, because they are all "amazing" (confusing) structures, but not all mazes are labyrinths because not all mazes have a path to a center. Third, the story of the Labyrinth is the story of a dangerous journey. Fourth, since a genuine labyrinth involves a single non-branching path to the center and back out again the difficulty finding the path in the labyrinth is primarily psychological (one easily loses oneʼs way). Fifth, since Theseusʼ plan is to end the sacrifice of Athenian youths, it is a story of redemption. Sixth, the journey requires going through the center of the labyrinth and out again. Seventh, it is a dangerous journey requiring courage because one might lose oneʼs life to the Minotaur. Eighth, it is a journey from bondage to freedom. Ninth, Theseus needs a "clue," "Ariadneʼs thread," to escape the labyrinth. 10 This can be summarized in 9 Labyrinth-themes,  (L1) The labyrinth is an amazing complicated and confusing structure.  (L2) The labyrinth has a path to a center while a mere maze might or might not have a path to a center.  (L3) The story of the Labyrinth is about a journey.  (L4) The Labyrinth is confusing largely for psychological reasons.  (L5) The journey is one of redemption.  (L6) The journey goes through the center of the labyrinth.  (L7) The journey is dangerous and requires courage.  (L8) The journey is from bondage to freedom.  (L9) Escape from the Labyrinth requires a "thread" or "clue" that points the way out. Furthermore, the Minotaur had been created when Poseidon gave King Minos a "wonderfully beautiful bull." Unfortunately, King Minosʼ wife, Pasiphaë, fell "madly in love" with the bull. King Minos, being, apparently, an understanding sort, rigged a wooden contraption which his wife could use to simulate a cow and entice the bull to a tryst. The plan succeeds and Pasiphaë gives birth to the monstrous half-man half-bull Minotaur. Pasiphaë is the daughter of Helios, the Sun god, which explains the Minotaurʼs name, Asterion ("ruler of the stars"). Thus, the Minotaur is half-divine and half-beast. Since it is natural to think of a human being as midway between gods and beasts, 11 the monster Theseus faces in the labyrinth is not so different from himself, which is reflected in the Jungian view that the labyrinth symbolizes the unconscious. 12 On this view, the journey toward the Minotaur at the center of the labyrinth is the terrifying journey of self-knowledge. 13 Thus,  (L10) The Minotaur symbolizes our own beast nature.
The second story begins with King Minos not too happy at Theseusʼ escape and departure with his daughter. Since he believes Theseus could not have escaped without Daedalusʼ help, he puts Daedalus and his son, Icarus, into the labyrinth as punishment. Daedalus knows the labyrinth cannot be escaped by water or land so he fashions two pairs of wings that he and Icarus may fly to freedom. 14 Daedalus warns Icarus not fly near the sun, since the wings will melt and he will fall to the sea. 15 Unfortunately, Icarusʼ new power goes to his head, he flies too high, his wings melt, and he falls to his death. Thus,  (L11) The attempt to escape the labyrinth by exceeding human limitations (flying near the divine realm) inevitably results in failure.
Further, since the labyrinth has become a symbol of the chaos of life. 16  (L12) The journey through the labyrinth symbolizes the journey through the chaos of life.  (L14) The labyrinth also symbolizes the cosmos.
For these reasons, the journey through the labyrinth makes a natural religious symbol of a personʼs spiritual journey on earth. Augustine mentions the labyrinth in City of God. 19 Calvan emphasizes the numerous labyrinths that confront Christians. 20 Goethe, 21 who influenced both Wittgenstein and Borges, refers to "lifeʼs devious labyrinthine ways" in the Dedication to the religiously-themed Faust. Thus,  (L15) The journey through the labyrinth symbolizes the human earthly journey through spiritual darkness.
The Orthodox Interpretation of Wittgensteinʼs Zettel 608
No supposition seems to me more natural than that there is no process in the brain correlated with associating or with thinking; < *I+f I talk or write, there is, I assume, a system of impulses going out from my brain and correlated with my spoken or written thoughts. But why should the system continue further in the direction of the center? Why should this order not proceed, so to speak, out of chaos? Zettel (608)
Z608 invokes the same concepts, the center and the emergence of order from chaos, found in the labyrinth story. § V argues that 14 of the 15 L-themes listed in Scheer, 25 McGinn, 26 and Hark 27 endorse some version of NI, the view that the center and chaos referenced in Z608 are the neural center and neural chaos. All read Z608 as proposing some theory about brain processes. Since, however, Wittgenstein opposes philosophical theories, Z608 cannot, to be consistent, be proposing any theories.
Second, Z608 does not state that language and thought might arise out of chaos. Z608 states only that they might, so to speak ("sozusagen") arise out of chaos. This is the language of comparison (PI, 130-131; RFM, V. 12), 28 not theory. The "sozusagen" qualifies the language as figurative language: "What I invent are new comparisons" (CV, 16).
Third, NI gets the direction of the neural impulses in Z608 backwards. Consider the 2nd and 3rd sentences in Z608,  (S1) There is, I assume, a system of impulses going out from my brain and correlated with my spoken or written thoughts.  (S2) But why should the system continue further in the direction of the center? S1 reiterates the common view that neural impulses coming out of the brain produce "spoken and written thoughts." Since those spoken and written thoughts are in the public world, the direction of motion in S1 is from the brain towards the public world. Since S2 asks why this "system of [neural] of reference of our examination must be rotated, but around the fixed point [Angelpunkt] of our real need." Anscombe translates "Angelpunkt" as fixed-point, but a more literal translation is "center-point." 29 Wittgenstein goes on in the next sentence to identify the center-point of his investigations as "ordinary life." Similarly, RFM (IV. 15) identifies "the center of gravity [Schwerpunkt]" of mathematics as action. Wittgenstein identifies the center-point of his philosophical investigations as human life.
Finally, since the chaos is where the center is, and since the center is forms of life, RCI holds that the chaos referenced in Z608 is the chaos in forms of life. At Z567 Wittgenstein describes "the great swarm [ganze Gewimmel] of human actions" as "the background" against which the meaning of human actions is judged. But how does this apply to the understanding of a difficult sentence? Wittgenstein (PI, 525) First, to understand the meaning of a sentence is to see it against the background (context). Second, understanding the meaning of a sentence is like understanding its role in a narrative. Thus, linguistic meaning is akin to literary, not scientific, concepts. Third, Wittgensteinʼs parenthetical point clarifies the connection between language and "chaos" from Z608. If a sentence has meaning by virtue of its role in a context, and if such roles point to a multitude of familiar paths (other sentences, roles and contexts) that "lead off" from it "in every direction," and each of those point to new sentences, new roles, new contexts <, and so on, then the meaning of any sentence is connected with the meanings of an infinite number (a "chaos" of other sentences, roles, and contexts) . This has nothing to do with neural chaos but with the "chaos" deriving from the infinite possibilities of human life.
Consider the obscure last sentence, call it S, in Borgesʼ GS: "This is why I do not pronounce the formula, why, lying here in the darkness, I let the days obliterate me." What kind of formula is it? Is it like a mathematical formula or like one of Hegelʼs formulas-or something else? What is oneʼs motive in not pronouncing it? Is it physical, moral, spiritual, or intellectual darkness? How do the days "obliterate" one? Can one elude the obliteration by stating the formula < and so on?
Note first that one cannot calculate the meaning of S from its parts-as if the meaning of S were a "compositional function" of the meanings of its parts. 30 On the contrary, what one requires is the story within which S plays a role, 31 e.g., the fact that Borgesʼ protagonist is in a prison, that he is a magician, that he belongs to Mesoamerican culture, etc. Borrowing Wittgensteinʼs words, these facts, and others like them, lead off from S in a "multitude of paths" PI (525), and provide the first glimpse of Sʼs meaning. Unfortunately, a new path always opens up. In Borgesʼ terms, the meaning of a sentence appears like "a book which had the possibility of continuing indefinitely" (GFP, 25) . 32 Gibsonʼs 33 remark that "one never finishes with any of Borgesʼ stories parallels Wittgensteinʼs PI (525) point that despite the dreams of legions of linguists, there is a sense in which one never finishes with meaning of any sentence."
From this perspective, Z608 takes on a very different aspect. Since Z608 indicates that the neural impulses move toward the center, i.e., forms of life, and since the chaos is where the center is, Z608 suggests that language and thought arise, not out of physical chaos at the neural center, but out of the chaotic Ganze Gewimmel of human action in the Angelpunkt (center-point) of human life. NI has transfigured an existential point about the labyrinthine pathways of human existence into some generally unpalatable scientific theories about neural processes-precisely the sorts of theories Wittgenstein rejects as irrelevant.
The Religious-Cosmological Interpretation of Zettel 608
Wittgenstein *told+ his close friend < Drury: < "I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view." Malcolm, Wittgenstein: From a Religious Point of View? (1) 34 The lone alternative to NI is the religious-cosmological interpretation (RCI). Inspired by Wittgensteinʼs remark to Drury that he cannot help looking at philosophical problems from a religious point of view, RCI holds that the language of Z608 is not the forbidden (for Wittgenstein) mechanisms. It is the religious language of creation: the emergence of order out of chaos at the center. Recall the critique of NI.
First, NI reads Z608 as proposing theories about the arising of language and thought from chaos, when Z608 only states that language and thought may, sozusagen, arise from chaos. Second, Z608, carefully read, states the neural impulses are moving from the brain towards the center, which locates the center (Angelpunkt of our real need) in human life. Third, since the chaos is where the center is, Z608 is suggesting is that language and thought arise out of the chaotic Ganze Gewimmel in human behavior in that public center-point of human life.
RCI agrees that Z608 is not advancing theories. The language in Z608 is akin to the figurative language in creation stories in Hesiod and Augustine. RCI also agrees that in many ancient cosmogonies order emerges from chaos via motion towards the true center. 35, 36 This archetypal imagery is found in many religious writers, some of whom, such as Goethe 37 and Augustine, 38 influenced Wittgenstein. RCI sees Z608, not as proposing theories about the causes of language and thought, but as attempting to shed light on the nature of language by comparing the production of language with the genesis of order out of chaos in creation stories.
Borgesʼ Notion of the Labyrinth
I dreamt of an exiguous and nitid labyrinth; in the center was a water jar; my hands almost touched it, < but so intricate and perplexed were the curves that I knew I would die before reaching it. < A labyrinth is a structure compounded to confuse men; < a chaos of heterogeneous worlds, < Borges, "The Immortal" (107, (110) (111) Consider Borgesʼ labyrinth imagery in connection with the 15 L-themes in § I. The epigraph (above) makes clear that Borges employs L1 (The labyrinth is an amazingly complicated/confusing structure), and L2 (The labyrinth has a center), L4 (The Labyrinth is confusing for psychological reasons), and L6 (the movement is towards the center). L3 (The labyrinth-story describes a journey) is everywhere in Borges but the epigraph above is preceded in the text by a reference to "our journey" (TI, 109). Borges employs L5 (The journey promises redemption) when, at HA (140), the Minotaur refers to Theseus as his redeemer. Borges employs L7 (The journey through the labyrinth is dangerous and requires courage) in TI (115) where he writes that "every act [men] execute may be their last" and also in his description of the heroic Fergus Kilpatrick in TTH (72-73). Since the Zahir symbolizes free-will, Borges employs L8 (The journey is a journey to freedom) when he refers to the Zahir at the center of the labyrinth (TZ, 163).
Although Borges refers to Ariadne (HA, 140), the passage has nothing to do with Ariadneʼs "thread," but with the odd fact that the Minotaur "hardly defended himself" against Theseus. Indeed, Borges seems unconcerned with clues for escaping the labyrinth. It is argued later that this is a positive fact about Borgesʼ modern conception of the Labyrinth. Thus, the discussion of the "thread" or "clue" in L9 is postponed until § V.
Borges also employs L10 (The danger at the center of the labyrinth is our own bestial nature) when, in HA (140), the Minotaur, referring to Theseus, asks if he, his "redeemer," will "be like me." L11 (The attempt to escape the labyrinth by exceeding human limitations is bound to fail), is among Borgesʼ central themes. 39 Although Funes possesses a superhuman capacity to remember details, "I suspect he was not very capable of thought" (FM, 66). Accordingly, Funes died of "congestion of the lungs" (FM, 66).
One might infer that L12 (The labyrinth symbolizes chaos), is found in Borges in the remark in FE to the mazelike city as "a chaos of heterogeneous worlds" but the point of FE, with L2, is to distinguish a labyrinth proper, which is "rich in symmetries," from a mere maze-like structure that does not possess a center, and which is, therefore, monstrous and hateful. Although FEʼ s reference to the body of a bull suggests a comparison with the Minotaur from the Cretan story, the creature with the body of a bull or tiger is the reverse of the Minotaur with the head of a bull. Borgesʼ point is that this chaotic maze-like city is quite unlike a labyrinth proper. Thus, the chaos symbolized in FE is not labyrinthine chaos but the different kind of chaos of "heterogeneous worlds" (see the discussion of L14). 40 Borges does, however, employ L12 in the "chaotic novel" in GFP (25-26). This labyrinth, as "a cyclic volume, a circular one," does possess the symmetries Borges requires of a genuine labyrinth. Borgesʼ labyrinth symbolizes chaos but it is a different kind of chaos from that of a "hateful" unsymmetrical maze in FE.
39. Irby, introduction to Borgesʼ Labyrinths, xvi. 40. In his review of Citizen Kane, Borges describe Kane as "a simulacrum, a chaos of appearances" and goes on to state that "nothing is so frightening as a labyrinth with no center" [Dan Piepenbring, "Sartre and Borges on Welles," The Paris Review New York, August 12, 2014, retrieved from goo.gl/ZGfje1]. A labyrinth without a center is much more frightening and hateful than a labyrinth proper. L13 (The escape from the labyrinth symbolizes the emergence of order from chaos) is illustrated in GFP (26) in Borgesʼ contrast between Tsʼui Pênʼs "chaotic novel," which "choose [s] simultaneously" all paths and normal novels which "choose one and eliminate the others." That is, normal fiction writers, unlike Tsʼ ui Pên, choose to create order in the chaos of possibilities. 41 Borges also employs L14 (The labyrinth is a symbol of the cosmos). Since Borgesʼ paradigm of the labyrinth is time (LB, 52; TC, 235), one example of L14 is Borgesʼ reference in TU to time as "the perfect synonym of the cosmos." See also the archetupal cosmic imagery elsewhere in Borgesʼs works (LB, 52; FSP, 190, 192) . This illuminates Borgesʼ reference in FE to the mazelike city as "a chaos of heterogeneous worlds."
It was pointed out earlier in the discussion of L12 that FE cannot be used to illustrate the theme that the labyrinth symbolizes chaos. Whereas the classical notion of the cosmos is the idea of a whole unified by a single idea, this mazelike city is not a unified whole but is more like several incompatible worlds that have been forced together.
Borges also employs L15 (The journey through the labyrinth symbolizes manʼ s spiritual journey through worldly darkness). This is present in the description in TI (109) of the pilgrimʼs descent through "a chaos of sordid galleries < into the darkness below" in a labyrinth that "treacherously returns to the same chamber."
One might object that that these various L-themes are not found in Borges in a straightforward form. For example, surely Borges is satirical when he suggests that the Minotaur is redeemed by his killer or that the Zahir at the center of the labyrinth symbolize freedom-but this misses the point. The claim is not that these L-themes have exactly the same meaning in the Cretan story, Borges, and Wittgenstein. Borges employs these L-themes in order to express his own unique insights into the paradoxical nature of human life. Indeed, it would diminish Borgesʼ work if his meaning turned out to be the same with themes in the Cretan story or in Wittgenstein. The present paper claims only that the language and concepts of these L-theses is found in the Cretan story, in Borges and in Wittgenstein and that seeing this discloses a new dimensions in Wittgensteinʼs labyrinth-imagery, roughly that his imagery, like the imagery in Z608, is broadly existential rather than scientific. [W] e always have to reach some sort of firm ground, < so < a picture at the root of all our thinking is to be respected & not treated as a superstition.
The Labyrinth-Interpretation of Wittgensteinʼs View of Language
41. In TI (114), Borges, true to form, reverses the usual order and has chaos created after cosmos. Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (95) 42 Once, in addition to the Secret, there was a legend (and perhaps a cosmogonic myth), but the shallow men of the Phoenix have forgotten it < Borges, The Sect of the Phoenix (102) 43 Whereas NI reads Z608 as proposing controversial empirical theories about the neural processes believed to underlie language and thought, RCI holds that Z608 is written in the literary language of religious cosmogony. The present section, building on RCI, argues that Wittgensteinʼs archetypal religiouscosmological imagery in Z608 is closely related to his labyrinth imagery but that LI includes the themes from RCI but links up with numerous other passages in Wittgenstein untouched by RCI.
It should be no surprise that RCI and LI are connected. The key concepts in Z608 are the cosmogony-concepts of the emergence of order from chaos at the center-and the concepts of the center (L2, L6), the emergence of order from chaos (L12-L13) and the cosmos (L14) also appear in the labyrinth story. It is the other concepts in the 16 L-themes that may seem more difficult to locate in Wittgenstein. Consider these 16 L-themes one by one.
First, there is no problem linking L1 (The labyrinth is an amazing complicated structure) to Wittgensteinʼs text. Indeed, this is the only one of the 16 L-themes that is accepted both by the ordinary interpretation of PI (203) and by LI. Second, Wittgenstein, in keeping with L2, like Borges, employs both the notions of a labyrinth and a maze, and Wittgenstein, like Borges, compares a city to a maze. At PI (18), Wittgenstein describes a city that, one might say, arose, without a plan or idea, from the chaos of human life as changing needs arise. Such a mazelike city may or may not have a center, and none is mentioned by Wittgenstein. But Wittgenstein does hold that language proper is structured around a center-the Angelpunkt of our real need. Thus, one can compare Wittgensteinʼs concept of the mazelike city at PI (18) with Borgesʼ mazelike city at TI (110-111), and contrasts both of these with the notion of a symmetrical (centered) labyrinth employed by both Wittgenstein and Borges. Third, in the Preface to PI, in keeping with L3, Wittgenstein compares his remarks to "a number of sketches of landscapes" made in the course of his "long and involved journeys" Indeed, one might think he is alluding to the odyssey here. 44 These journeys require one to "travel over a wide field of thought criss- 12, no. 3 (1975) . cross in every direction." Note that the language here is strikingly similar to Virgilʼs description in the Aeneid: 45 "The Labyrinth between walls in the dark ran criss-cross a bewildering thousand ways." If one explains Wittgensteinʼs notion of the labyrinth by reference to such minimally described journeys, instead of the reverse, explaining Wittgensteinʼs notion of these journeys by reference to his richer labyrinth imagery, one misses the special structure in the labyrinth story. The role of this richer structure in Wittgensteinʼs views becomes clearer as we proceed.
Fourth, with L4, Wittgenstein holds that the philosophical confusions that arise out of language are psychological rather than objective. Wittgenstein (PI, 89) quotes Augustineʼs remark that if no one asks me about time I know it but if someone asks me to explain it I cannot. Thus, it is not that language is intrinsically confusing. It is only when we do philosophy that we become like "savages" and lose our way (PI, 194) . Fifth, with L5, Wittgenstein holds that the philosophical journey is one of redemption. First, he felt a great personal need for redemption. 46 Second, he saw his philosophical concerns with the laws of the excluded middle, non-contradiction and the limits of language as connected with the problem of redemption: 47 "What fights doubt is, as it were, redemption [Wʼs italics]" (CV, 39). He goes further: "[I]f I am REALLY [Wʼs capitals] to be redeemed, -I need certainty, -not wisdom, dreams, speculation -and this certainty is faith" (CV, 33)-and this precisely parallels his solution to philosophical doubt in OC. Thus, Wittgensteinʼ philosophical journey is not merely an intellectual (academic) exercise. It is, sozusagen, a journey of redemption.
Fifth, with L6, Wittgenstein holds that the philosophical journey must go through the center. At RFM (VII. 15) he writes, In this field one can ask all sorts of things which, whole they belong to the topic still do not lead through its center. A particular series of questions leads through the center and out into the open [Freie] .
Like Theseusʼ journey through the labyrinth, Wittgensteinʼs philosophical journey leads though the center of the labyrinth and into the "open."
Wittgenstein also holds, with L7, that the philosophical journey is dangerous and requires courage. In a letter to his friend Hutt, he writes that though he has little courage himself he always feels "much freer and happier" once he has "screwed up my courage to do something." 48 This is also reflected in his 45. Virgil, Aeneid, trans. Robert Fitzgerald (New York: Vintage, 1984) Wittgenstein goes further: "Genius is not 'talent and character' but character manifesting itself in the form of a special talent. While one man will show courage by jumping into the water, another will show courage by writing a symphony" (CV, 40). It takes courage, not mere intellect, to decipher the labyrinth of language.
Wittgensteinʼs journey through the labyrinth is also, with L8, a journey from bondage to freedom. Wittgenstein expresses his feeling of bondage: "The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to" (PI, 133) . Further, in the discussion of L6, it emerged that he sees the philosophical journey going "through the center and into the open [ins Freie]." But "frei" means "free" and "ins Freie" means "out of doors" or "into the open." Just as Theseus needed to get free of the labyrinth by getting "into the open," getting free, the philosopher needs to do something similar.
Since the discussion of L9, the need for a "thread" to escape the labyrinth, is taken up later, consider L10 (The danger at the center of the labyrinth is our own beast nature). Indeed, Wittgenstein stresses that language arises, not from some divine realm, but out of animal instinct: "I really want to say that scruples in thinking begin with (have their roots in) instinct" (Z, 391). He repeats this theme in his discussion of certainty: "I want to conceive *certainty+ as something < beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal" (OC, 359) . 49 Thus, part of what one discovers when one reaches the center of Wittgensteinʼs labyrinth is that human language and thought do not, as it were, fall from heaven, but, rather, arise organically out of oneʼs animal nature. 50 L11 (The attempt to escape the labyrinth by exceeding human limitations inevitably results in failure), is one of the most important themes in Wittgenstein. Like Icarus, the philosopher flies too close to the divine: " [T] he form of expression we use seems to have been designed for a god, who knows what we cannot know; he sees the whole of this infinite series, < etc" (PI, 426). Philosophers believe they can do this because they tend to see human cognition as "surrounded by a halo" (PI, 97), i.e., as partaking of the divine. Unfortunately, this divine route is no more open to the philosopher than it is for Icarus: "We see the straight 49. Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty [OC], ed. G. E. M. Anscombe, and G. H. von Wright, trans. Denis Paul, and G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1972) .
50. Wittgenstein here generally follows Nietzsche [Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1966) , Part I, § 2-3].
highway before us, but, of course, we cannot use it because it is permanently closed" (PI, 426). The philosopher makes the same mistake as the fly in the fly bottle (PI, 309) . Like Icarus, the flyʼs immediate instinct is to fly upwards-towards the sky, leading to its fall to its death in the waters below. Ironically, there is a much easier escape route available to the fly. It simply needs to walk down and under the lip of the fly-bottle. The philosopher must do the same: "We need to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground (PI, 107)! Icarus, the philosopher, and the fly all suffer from the same immediate instinct, to fly upwards (towards the divine)-and it is that which dooms them. The only road open to human beings is to walk out of the labyrinth. Thus, Wittgensteinʼs later philosophy aims to bring the philosopher "down to earth" (BB, 1)-where s/he can walk. 51 Wittgenstein also employs L12 (The labyrinth symbolizes chaos). At CV (65), he writes that the philosopher must "descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there." 52 Wittgensteinʼs philosopher must learn to reside in the chaos of the labyrinth and make it their home-an important point to which we return later.
Wittgenstein also employs L13 (the journey though the labyrinth symbolizes the emergence of order from chaos). For, if the labyrinth of language is chaotic, then "[t]he form of a philosophical problem is 'I donʼt know my way about'" (PI, 123). However, with the aid of "philosophical grammar" (PI, 664), one can discern a kind of order in the labyrinth of language, although not the kind of logical order one had expected: "We see that what we call 'sentence' and 'language' has not the formal unity that I imagined but is a family of structures more or less related to one another" (PI, 108).
Wittgenstein also employs L14 (The labyrinth symbolizes the cosmos). Recall that he had employed cosmological language in TLP 5.63: "I am my world (The microcosm)." 53 Since 5.63 is a direct comment on 5.6 ("The limits of the language mean the limits of my world"), his TLP identified the limits of language with those of the microcosm. Thus, when he later compares language to a labyrinth, he is implicitly comparing language to the microcosm: The limits of the labyrinth become the limits of his world (as they almost did for Theseus).
One might object that Wittgenstein may not accept these views of TLP in his later period. This is true, but, first, Wittgenstein never renounced his microcosmic doctrine. Second, since it is independently true that the labyrinth symbolizes the cosmos, the comparison of language to a labyrinth in PI (203) simply repeats the cosmological image of TLP in different terms.
Wittgenstein also employs both L15 (The journey through the labyrinth symbolizes manʼs spiritual journey through worldly darkness) and L16 (The journey through the labyrinth is a journey to spiritual fulfillment). At PI (Preface) Wittgenstein refers to the "poverty" and "darkness of our time" and at PI (635) he suggests that when remembering a scene it is "as if" one could "read the darkness." Both of these images come straight out Augustine, who Wittgenstein "revered." 54 Given Wittgensteinʼs remark to Drury that he cannot help seeing philosophical problems from a religious point of view, these remarks suggest that Wittgenstein sees his philosophical journey as analogous to a spiritual pilgrimage except that his pilgrimage is through the poverty and darkness of philosophical confusion to a kind of philosophical fulfillment.
Finally, let us return to L9 (The escape from the labyrinth requires a "thread" or clue). Note first that Wittgenstein repeatedly mentions a "thread" that runs through the phenomena. At RFM (VII. 5) he refers to someone who, in following a rule, is under the impression that he has "followed a thread that is already there." Of course, Wittgensteinʼs point here is this person is mistaken-and this indicates the point at which Wittgensteinʼs labyrinth-story diverges, instructively, from the classical labyrinth-story. Theseus did follow a thread that was "already there" but Wittgenstein holds that there is no thread that can be mechanically followed to escape the labyrinth. Indeed, Wittgenstein does not believe that one can escape the labyrinth. How could he? That would me one gets beyond language. Rather, Wittgenstein councils that one must learn to live in the chaos-to make it oneʼs home. Thus, the freedom Wittgenstein seeks is not the complete freedom from the labyrinth achieved by Theseus. It is the freedom one achieves, by means of philosophical grammar, of "knowing oneʼs way about." Borges too suggests that escape from the labyrinth is impossible: "I felt that the world was a labyrinth from which it was impossible to flee" (DC, 85). Whereas Theseus was able to escape from the labyrinth, Borges and Wittgenstein live in a modern labyrinth from which there is no escape.
Whereas Ariadneʼs thread provides Theseus with a "direct < relationship" with the exit from the labyrinth, PI (67) only describes a thread that requires new decisions as each new fiber in the thread is spun. If one thinks this link between the thread at PI (67) to Ariadneʼs thread is too tenuous, consider Z (26), where Wittgenstein asks whether a "red thread" runs through a certain set of mental phenomena, and answers "No." But why a red thread? Why not blue? In fact, 54. Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, 59. Philosophizing is a deed that requires the engagement of the whole person, not just the intellect, but, by the same token, it offers a kind of reward that goes well beyond the satisfaction of solving sterile intellectual puzzles.
Recall that Z608 is important for LI because it is in Z608 that the key notions of motion towards the center and the emergence of order from chaos are clearly visible. Against this background, consider two key sentences of Z608, numbered S2 and S3 for convenience,  S2 But why should the system [of neural impulses] continue further in the direction of the center?  S3 Why should this [linguistic] order not proceed, sozusagen, out of chaos?
While NI interprets these images in neurophysiological terms, LI, following the language in Borges, provides a, roughly, existential model of this dynamic. Thus, from LIʼs perspective, what S2 really asks is an existential question: Why would anyone think that a mere material system of neural impulses takes one any closer to the center of the labyrinth of life, the Angelpunkt of our real need, where language really arises? Similarly, instead of the common view that language arises out of the brain, what S3 really asks is also an existential question:
Why should language not arise, sozusagen, out of the chaos of (the labyrinth of) life? That is, LI sees Wittgensteinʼs later philosophy as the description of the journey, akin to an odyssey, through the labyrinth of life to the chaotic center of human forms of life, themselves grounded in animal instinct, where linguistic meaning really "arises."
One might object to the present literary interpretation (LI) of Wittgensteinʼs philosophy inspired by his use of the Labyrinth-imagery, that LI seems to have little to do with Wittgensteinʼs philosophical method, which he calls "philosophical grammar" and which consists in a "quiet weighing of linguistic facts" (PI, 496; Z, 447) . It is important, however, to recognize that LI purports to characterize, not Wittgensteinʼs conception of philosophy per se, but his conception of philosophizing. It is the activity of doing philosophy that is illuminated by the existential dimensions of Wittgensteinʼs archetypal labyrinthimagery.
